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Abstract: 
In this paper we focus on technology that resulted from R&D projects funded by US Small 
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Phase II awards. We ask: Is there evidence that strategic 
commercial agreements allow foreign firms to exploit the technologies developed through the 
SBIR program and funded by US taxpayers? Based on descriptive information from Phase II 
SBIR-funded project data collected by the National Research Council within the National 
Academies, we conclude that SBIR funds for Phase II projects and the technologies associated 
with those projects are not, to a pronounced extent, benefitting foreign firms through agreements 
with SBIR firms or investors. In that sense, there is no evidence that the technologies developed 
with funds from US taxpayers are, to any significant extent, being exploited by foreign firms 
through commercial agreements with SBIR firms. 
 technology | small entrepreneurial firms | SBIR program | strategic agreements | Keywords:
public funding | research and development | publicly funded technology | exploitation 
Article: 
1 Introduction 
 
Technology-based firms adopt a portfolio of strategies to maximize profits. Examples include, 
but are certainly not limited to, the development of a new technology with the expectation of 
selling or licensing it to other firms or even an expectation of being acquired by or merging with 
other firms. Alternatively, firms might pursue further research through R&D agreements. Firms 
might also attempt to realize more fully the profit potential of their developed technology by 
entering into manufacturing or marketing or distribution agreements, customer agreements, or 
joint ventures. Any or all of these strategic commercial agreements can be viewed as a rational 
effort to maximize profits. 
The consequences for spillovers of technology associated with these strategies are, from a policy 
perspective, important if the underlying R&D project is publicly funded. For example, consider a 
firm that pursues a research project funded with public US moneys and develops a technology, 
but it sells the rights to the technology to another firm, say an international firm. Thus, part of the 
economic impact of the award will then not only occur outside of the funded firm but also 
outside of the United States. 
 
In this paper we focus on technology that resulted from R&D projects funded by US Small 
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Phase II awards.1 We ask whether there is evidence that 
strategic commercial agreements allow foreign firms to exploit the technologies developed 
through the SBIR program and funded by US taxpayers.2 
The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows. In Sect. 2 we briefly overview the SBIR 
program and the data used in the analysis presented in Sect. 3. Section 4 concludes the paper 
with brief summary remarks. 
2 The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program 
 
The SBIR program is a set aside program created by the Small Business Innovation 
Development Act of 1982 (P.L. 97–219; hereafter, the 1982 Act).3 The 1982 Act required all 
government departments and agencies with external research programs of greater than $100 
million to establish their own SBIR program and to set aside funds equal to 0.20 % of the 
external research budget. Thus, the program redirects R&D funds for competitive awards to 
small, and often entrepreneurial firms rather than appropriating new monies for R&D.4 
As part of the 1982 Act, SBIR program awards were structured and defined by three phases. The 
purpose of Phase I awards is to assist firms as they assess within a 6 month period the feasibility 
of an idea’s scientific and commercial potential in response to the funding agency’s objectives. 
Phase II awards generally last for 2 years. These awards are for the firm to develop further its 
proposed research, ideally leading to a commercializable product, process, or service. Further 
work on the projects launched through the SBIR program occurs in what is called Phase III, 
which does not involve SBIR funds. At this stage, firms needing additional financing—to ensure 
that the product, process, or service can move into the marketplace—are expected to obtain it 
from sources other than the SBIR program. 
The program has been reauthorized several times and the set aside has increased to 2.50 % of an 
agency’s external research budget.5 The program was most recently reauthorized on December 
31, 2011 for a period of 6 years (P.L. 112–81). Phase I 6-month awards are now capped at 
150,000 and Phase II 2- year awards are capped at 1,000, 000, although the latter cap is often 
exceeded. 
Eleven agencies currently participate in the SBIR program: the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National 
Science Foundation (NSF), and the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Commerce (DoC), 
Defense (DoD), Education (ED), Energy (DOE), Health and Human Services (HHS, particularly 
the National Institutes of Health (NIH)), Transportation (DoT), and, most recently, Homeland 
Security (DHS).6 
The Small Business Reauthorization Act of 2000 mandated that, among other things, the 
National Research Council (NRC) within the National Academies conduct an evaluation of the 
economic benefits achieved by the SBIR program and make recommendations to Congress for 
improvements to the program. As part of its evaluation, the NRC conducted an extensive and 
balanced survey in 2005 of 6,408 Phase II funded and completed projects from a population of 
11,214 project awards made between 1992 and 2001 by five agencies: DoD, NIH within HHS, 
NASA, DOE, and NSF. These five agencies accounted for nearly 97 % of total awards in 2005. 
The number and percentage of respondents from these 6,408 surveyed projects is shown in Table 
1.7 The total number of responding projects was 1,916, and the average response rate across all 
five agencies was 30 %. Also shown in Table 1 is the total number of projects in the final 
random sample of completed Phase II projects, by agency. For these projects, the project data are 
summarized below. 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics on the National Research Council survey of phase II awards 
Agency Phase II sample size Respondents Response rate (%) Random samplea 
DoD 3,055 920 30 891 
NIH 1,678 496 30 495 
NASA 779 181 23 177 
DOE 439 157 36 154 
NSF 457 162 35 161 
All agencies 6,408 1,916 30 1,878 
aThe NRC surveyed a number of non-randomly selected projects because they were projects that 
had realized significant commercialization, and the NRC wanted to be able to describe such 
interesting success stories. These non-randomly selected projects are not considered 
3 The formation of strategic commercial alliances 
 
Consider the descriptive data in Table 2; several generalizations can be inferred. One, 
commercial agreements by SBIR-funded firms are more common with other US firms and 
investors than with foreign firms and investors. There are only two instances where finalized 
agreements with foreign firms or investors are greater than with US firms or investors. Among 
the NASA sample, 8.0 % of the firms had formalized a licensing agreement with foreign firms or 
investors compared to 6.2 % with domestic firms or investors. And, 1.7 % of the firms in the 
NSF sample had formalized a merger with foreign firms or investors compared to 0 % with US 
counterparts. 
Table 2 
Agreements with other firms or investors: percentage of the random sample of phase II projects 
answering the question: “As a result of the technology developed during this project, which of 
the following describes your firm’s activities with other firms and investors? (Select all that 
apply.)” 
  
US 
Firms/investors 
Foreign 
Firms/investors 
Agreement 
Finalized 
agreements 
Ongoing 
negotiations 
Finalized 
agreements 
Ongoing 
negotiations 
DoD (n = 594) 
 Licensing agreement(s) 15.5 16.5 2.9 5.2 
 Sale of company 1.2 4.9 0.3 1.0 
 Partial sale of company 0.8 4.2 0.0 1.5 
 Sale of technology rights 4.4 9.9 1.0 2.9 
  
US 
Firms/investors 
Foreign 
Firms/investors 
Agreement Finalized 
agreements 
Ongoing 
negotiations 
Finalized 
agreements 
Ongoing 
negotiations 
 Company merger 0.3 3.2 0.2 0.7 
 Joint venture agreement(s) 3.7 8.1 1.2 2.2 
 Marketing/distribution agreement(s) 10.8 8.6 4.5 4.2 
 Manufacturing agreement(s) 3.4 8.8 2.7 2.4 
 R&D agreement(s) 13.8 13.8 2.5 3.4 
 Customer alliance(s) 13.1 14.5 4.2 3.0 
 Other 1.9 2.2 0.3 0.8 
NIH (n = 338) 
 Licensing agreement(s) 19.2 16.0 8.9 6.2 
 Sale of company 0.9 3.6 0.3 1.5 
 Partial sale of company 2.1 4.4 0.0 0.6 
 Sale of technology rights 5.6 7.4 0.6 0.9 
 Company merger 0.3 3.0 0.0 0.6 
 Joint venture agreement(s) 3.0 8.9 0.9 2.7 
 Marketing/distribution agreement(s) 21.3 10.4 12.4 6.5 
  
US 
Firms/investors 
Foreign 
Firms/investors 
Agreement Finalized 
agreements 
Ongoing 
negotiations 
Finalized 
agreements 
Ongoing 
negotiations 
 Manufacturing agreement(s) 7.1 3.8 2.4 2.1 
 R&D agreement(s) 14.8 10.7 4.1 3.0 
 Customer alliance(s) 8.3 10.1 2.7 0.9 
 Other 2.1 2.1 0.3 0.9 
NASA (n = 112) 
 Licensing agreement(s) 6.2 11.6 8.0 5.4 
 Sale of company 0.9 2.7 0.0 0.0 
 Partial sale of company 1.8 0.9 0.0 0.0 
 Sale of technology rights 0.9 7.1 0.9 2.7 
 Company merger 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Joint venture agreement(s) 0.9 4.5 0.0 1.8 
 Marketing/distribution agreement(s) 7.1 5.4 6.2 1.8 
 Manufacturing agreement(s) 1.8 6.2 1.8 0.0 
 R&D agreement(s) 15.2 9.8 3.6 0.9 
 Customer alliance(s) 10.7 8.9 6.2 0.0 
  
US 
Firms/investors 
Foreign 
Firms/investors 
Agreement Finalized 
agreements 
Ongoing 
negotiations 
Finalized 
agreements 
Ongoing 
negotiations 
 Other 2.7 3.6 0.9 0.9 
DOE (n = 114) 
 Licensing agreement(s) 15.8 15.8 5.3 8.8 
 Sale of company 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
 Partial sale of company 2.6 1.8 0.0 1.8 
 Sale of technology rights 5.3 6.1 0.9 3.5 
 Company merger 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 
 Joint venture agreement(s) 2.6 7.0 0.0 2.6 
 Marketing/distribution agreement(s) 9.6 7.0 8.8 2.6 
 Manufacturing agreement(s) 6.1 6.1 0.9 4.4 
 R&D agreement(s) 7.9 10.5 1.8 6.1 
 Customer alliance(s) 7.9 13.2 4.4 5.3 
 Other 2.6 0.0 0.9 0.0 
NSF (n = 121) 
 Licensing agreement(s) 19.8 21.5 9.9 6.6 
  
US 
Firms/investors 
Foreign 
Firms/investors 
Agreement Finalized 
agreements 
Ongoing 
negotiations 
Finalized 
agreements 
Ongoing 
negotiations 
 Sale of company 2.5 3.3 0.0 0.8 
 Partial sale of company 2.5 5.8 1.7 1.7 
 Sale of technology rights 5.0 15.7 4.1 3.3 
 Company merger 0.0 4.1 1.7 0.8 
 Joint venture agreement(s) 3.3 9.9 0.8 2.5 
 Marketing/distribution agreement(s) 15.7 12.4 8.3 2.5 
 Manufacturing agreement(s) 8.3 9.9 3.3 2.5 
 R&D agreement(s) 17.4 17.4 5.0 6.6 
 Customer alliance(s) 11.6 18.2 3.3 4.1 
 Other 1.7 2.5 0.8 0.0 
The overall percentage of projects that have agreement activities is less than would be the case if the percentages of projects were 
additive across the types of categories. They are not additive. Thus, for example for DoD, it will not in general be the case that 
16 % of the Phase II projects have finalized US licensing agreements while a completely different set of 14 % have finalized US 
R&D agreements and then yet another distinct 13 % have finalized US customer alliances. To determine the percentage of the 
random sample of Phase II projects with US agreements, with foreign agreements, and with both US and foreign agreements, we 
constructed the qualitative variables defined in the note to Table 3. Those variables are defined for all agencies 
Two, among US firms and investors, mergers and sale of the company are the least used 
strategies across all of the funding agencies. This compares to licensing agreements being the 
most used strategy by SBIR firms funded by DoD, NIH, DOE, and NSF. Following licensing 
agreements by firms and investors in these four agencies are R&D agreements—R&D 
agreements rank first among NASA firms. In addition, licensing agreements with US firms and 
investors are at least twice as common as those with foreign firms and investors, with the 
exception of the NASA sample. 
Three, licensing agreements and marketing/distribution agreements are the more common 
strategies with foreign firms or investors. 
And four, R&D agreements are significantly more common with US firms and investors than 
with foreign firms and investors. Perhaps, and this should be viewed as a tentative hypothesis, it 
is easier to monitor information leakages that are inevitable during collaborative R&D when the 
partner firms or investors are geographically closer and within the same boundaries of 
intellectual property protection, that is, with a US partner rather than a foreign partner. 
As shown in Table 3, US only agreements are more prevalent than US and foreign firm or 
investor agreements.8 Foreign only agreements are the least prevalent. Thus, we interpret the 
data in Tables 2 and 3 as suggestive evidence to conclude that US SBIR funds for Phase II 
projects and the technologies associated with those projects are not, to a pronounced extent, 
benefitting foreign firms through agreements with SBIR firms or investors. In that sense, there is 
no evidence that the technologies developed with funds from US taxpayers are, to any significant 
extent, being exploited by foreign firms through commercial agreements with SBIR firms. If 
there were such evidence of a substantial flow of SBIR technology to foreign firms, one could 
reasonably ask whether the US SBIR firms captured a substantial part of the benefits from the 
applications of the SBIR technology by the foreign firms.9 But, that question need not be asked. 
Table 3 has been omitted from this formatted document. 
Finally, in Table 4, we examine the use of alternative strategies by observing the level of sales 
from the specific technology developed during the Phase II project. Regardless of funding 
agency, the mean sales (by 2005) for those projects with no agreements—US or foreign 
agreement—are less than for projects with agreements. And, mean sales are greater when there 
are agreements with foreign firms or investors than when there are only US agreements. This 
finding, albeit based only on descriptive evidence and in some cases descriptive evidence based 
only on a handful of observations suggests that when such technology transfer does occur 
through commercial agreements among SBIR firms and foreign firms and investors, it is with 
projects that are relatively more successful as measured in terms of cumulative sales, supporting 
the belief that, for those cases, the SBIR firms are reaping substantial benefits from the 
technologies developed with the funds from US taxpayers. 
Table 4 has been omitted from this formatted document. 
4 Concluding remarks 
 
Descriptively, it appears that often aspects of the economic impact of SBIR funds are seen not 
completely in the SBIR award-recipient firm, but possibly in other firms because of strategic 
commercial agreements allowing other firms to use the technologies generated with SBIR Phase 
II awards. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the economic impacts at times accrue to foreign 
firms or foreign investors through such agreements, but the extent to which that occurs is small 
relative to spillovers to other US firms.10 
Thus, to answer the question posed in the Introduction: Is there evidence that strategic 
commercial agreements allow foreign firms to exploit the technologies developed through the 
SBIR program and funded by US taxpayers?, our conclusion is that the evidence supports the 
belief that such exploitation is minimal. 
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Footnotes 
1 This research was funded through a grant from the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research. The remainder of this paper draws directly from our final report to the Institute with 
permission of the Institute. That report was published as Link and Scott (2012). 
2 We are defining exploitation to mean that the resulting US funded technology is not being 
entirely used within the United States and that the benefits from the funded R&D are in part 
being captured by other countries. 
3 The 1982 Act amended the Small Business Act of 1953 (P.L. 85–536) which established the 
Small Business Administration. 
4 The economic role of the SBIR program is discussed in detail in Link and Scott (2010, 2012). 
A more detailed history of the program is in those references and in Link and Scott (2009, 
forthcoming). 
5 The 1982 Act allowed for this percentage to increase over time. 
6 DoD maintains the largest program, awarding over 50 % of total funds and accounting for over 
50 % of total awards. 
7 We thank Dr. Charles Wessner of the NRC for making these data available to us. 
8 See the note in Table 3 for the construction of this qualitative summary agreement variable. 
9 Of course, there is the possibility of spillovers of the technologies to foreign firms without any 
payments to the innovating SBIR firms—a possibility the NRC database does not allow us to 
assess. 
10 Link and Scott (2012) show, with respect to one economic impact, that strategic commercial 
agreements are often negatively associated with greater than projected employment growth 
within the firm. An SBIR-funded firm develops a technology during a Phase II project, but often 
sells the rights to the technology to another firm, mostly US firms and investors. Thus, the 
employment impact of the SBIR award is then realized elsewhere in the economy where the 
other firm has employment growth to support production using the technology developed in the 
SBIR project. 
 
 
